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SECTION 20 AFFILIATES OF BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES
H. RODGIN COHEN'
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 1933-1986
Prior to 1993, national and most state banks were prohibited
from underwriting and dealing in securities.!
In 1933, the so-called Glass-Steagall Act provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933 severely limited underwriting and dealing by
national banks,2 state member banks,3 all depository institutions,4 and
affiliates of national banks and state member banks.5 The limitations
were, however, differently phrased.
Sections 16, 5, and 21 contained flat prohibitions. There were
exceptions for "bank eligible" securities, principally government
securities. The direct prohibitions in Section 16 and 5 do not apply to
brokerage and permit investments in "investment securities"
(generally investment grade debt securities).
Section 20 prohibited affiliations between a member bank and a
securities firm only if the securities firm was "engaged principally" in
underwriting and dealing.
In addition, Section 32 prohibited personnel interlocks between
national and state member banks and securities firms primarily
engaged in underwriting and dealing.
In 1956, the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) prohibited
bank holding companies from engaging in any non-banking activities,
unless the Federal Reserve Board determined that the activity was
"so closely related to the business of banking... as to be a proper
incident thereto. '
' Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, New York; B.A., 1965, L.L.B., 1968,
Harvard College.
1. See McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1994)).
2. See Glass-Steagall Act § 16.
3. See id. at § 5.
4. See id. at § 21.
5. See id. at § 20.
6. See id. at § 4(c)(6).
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This provision was used by the Federal Reserve Board to extend
the Section 20 anti-affiliation provision to state non-member banks
that were within a holding company structure. It also enabled the
Federal Reserve Board to prohibit, under the Section 4(c)(8)
standards, affiliations between a bank and a securities firm within a
bank holding company structure, even if that securities firm satisfies
the Section 20 "engaged principally" test.
Between 1933 and 1984, there appear to have been no attempts
by banking organizations to establish securities affiliates that met the
Section 20 "engaged principally" test.
In 1984, Citicorp filed an application under the BHCA for a
subsidiary to engage in underwriting and dealing, defining "engaged
principally" in terms of not more than twenty percent of the
subsidiary's business being generated from underwriting and dealing
in bank ineligible securities. The Federal Reserve Board's reaction
was negative, and Citicorp withdrew its application.'
II. THE "COMMERCIAL PAPER" SECTION 20 AFFILIATE
In 1987, the Federal Reserve Board approved an application by
Bankers Trust to engage in private placements of commercial paper.8
III. THE "THREE (LATER FOUR) DWARFS" SECTION 20 AFFILIATES
In 1987, the Board approved applications by Citicorp, J.P.
Morgan, and Bankers Trust to establish a Section 20 affiliate under
the BHCA to underwrite and deal in commercial paper, municipal
revenue bonds, and mortgage backed-securities.9
The Federal Reserve Board subsequently approved a Section 20
application by Chemical Bank to underwrite and deal in consumer
receivable securities.
A. The 1987 Order Restrictions
1. Section 20
The "engaged principally" test was defined by the Federal
Reserve Board so that: (1) the Section 20 subsidiary could not obtain
more than five percent of its gross revenues from underwriting and
dealing in bank ineligible securities (Revenue Limit) and (2) the
Section 20 subsidiary could not have more than five percent of the
7. See 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 225 (1985).
8. See 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987).
9. See 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987) (the 1987 Order).
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domestic market for any type of security (Market Limit).
2. Section 4(c)(8)
The Federal Reserve Board imposed a series of so-called
"firewalls" which were designed to deal with issues of bank safety
and soundness, unfair competition and conflicts of interest.
B. SIA Challenge to the 1987 Order
SIA challenged the 1987 Order, but the Federal Reserve Board
was upheld. '° The applicants intervened and challenged the Market
Limit; the court upheld this challenge.
IV. THE CORPORATE DEBT AND EQUITY SECTION 20 AFFILIATES
In 1989, the Federal Reserve Board approved applications for
Section 20 affiliates to underwrite and deal in debt and equity
securities. Additional firewalls were imposed. Supervisory
(infrastructure) review was required, including risk management and
internal controls. SIA-sponsored litigation was again rejected.1 2
V. MINOR LIBERALIZATION: 1989-1995
In 1989, the Federal Reserve Board increased the Revenue Limit
from five percent to ten percent.'3 In 1993, the Federal Reserve
Board approved an alternative, index-based method for calculating
the Revenue Limit.'4
VI. MAJOR LIBERALIZATION AND PROPOSED LIBERALIZATION IN
1996
In 1996, the Federal Reserve Board proposed and adopted major
revisions to the regulatory regime for Section 20 affiliates.
In September 1996, the Federal Reserve Board reversed its prior
position and ruled that interest earned on debt securities in which a
national bank may invest in (investment securities) constitutes
eligible revenues. 5 In December 1996, the Federal Reserve Board
increased the Revenue Limit from ten percent to twenty-five
10. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987).
11. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989).
12. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs., 900 F.2d. 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
13. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 771 (1989).
14. See 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 226 (1993).
15. See Federal Reserve Press Release, Sept. 11, 1996.
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In July 1996, the Federal Reserve Board again reproposed the
modification of three firewalls, a modification that was first proposed
in 1990. These proposals were adopted in September 1996.17 The
firewall prohibiting virtually all interlocks was limited to the CEO
and a majority of the directors. The firewall prohibiting a bank from
cross-marketing services of its Section 20 affiliate was eliminated.
The firewall prohibiting asset transactions between a bank and its
Section 20 affiliate (other than U.S. government securities) was
liberalized to exempt assets with a broad and liquid market.
Late in 1996, the Federal Reserve Board proposed the
elimination of most of the remaining firewalls and the recodification
of the other firewalls as "operating standards."'
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1996 REGULATORY REVISIONS
The 1996 revisions have created the potential for substantial
internal growth by Section 20 affiliates. Of perhaps even more
importance, the 1996 revisions have created the potential for bank
holding company acquisitions of securities firms. Such acquisitions
have previously been few and very small in size."
The ten percent Revenue Limit has been a major obstacle. The
new twenty-five percent Revenue Limit positions many, and possibly
most, securities firms as eligible targets for acquisition by bank
holding companies. Even if a security firm is ineligible revenues
exceed the twenty-five percent limit, a matched book and other
arrangements can be utilized in an effort to increase eligible revenues
in order to meet the Revenue Limit.
Proposed firewall liberalization would enable Section 20
affiliates to be more competitive. The proposed reduction in special
capital requirements for Section 20 affiliates (twice normal SEC
requirements) is of particular importance.
A potential obstacle to bank holding company acquisitions of
securities firms is that some securities firms' activities may be
impermissible for bank holding companies. Examples of these
impermissible activities include: merchant banking, commodities,
insurance, and real estate investments.
16. See 61 Fed. Reg. 68750 (1996).
17. See 61 Fed. Reg. 57679.
18. See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (1997). Appendix I outlines the proposed revisions.
19. See, Dauphin-Hopper Soliday, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 672 (1992).
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VIII. CALCULATION OF THE REVENUE LIMIT
The objective is to reduce ineligible revenues (which is difficult
to accomplish) or increase eligible revenues or both. Early Federal
Reserve rules made compliance more difficult.
Use of revenues rather than assets to calculate the "engaged
principally" test was later reaffirmed. The Federal Reserve will not
permit multiple Section 20 affiliates to calculate Revenue Limit on a
combined basis or permit a Section 20 affiliate to compute the
Revenue Limit on a consolidated basis with its subsidiaries.
A significant problem in creating eligible revenues has been the
SEC's net capital rules under the Securities Exchange Act, which
effectively precludes a Section 20 affiliate from conducting non-
securities activities (e.g. the loans) as a principal.
The Federal Reserve has, however, permitted banks to shift non-
capital intensive activities, such as marketing and advisory services,
to Section 20 affiliates. In addition, services performed for affiliates
under Section 4(c)(1) of the BHCA is an effective way to create
eligible revenues.
IX. OTHER POSSIBLE STRUCTURE FOR SECURITIES AcriviTms
The FDIC permits subsidiaries of state nonmember banks to
underwrite and deal in securities, subject to certain limitations."
The Comptroller's recently adopted revision of its "Part 5"
regulations has the potential for enabling national banks to
underwrite and deal in securities through a subsidiary.
The BHCA should not apply to a subsidiary of a bank."
However, Section 20 would apply to a subsidiary of a national
bank.
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1996); see also Inv. Co. Inst. v. Fed. Deposit Corp. 815 F.2d
1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21. See Citicorp v. Board of Govs., 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1991).
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